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1 In this article, by “Social Education” we refer to the tasks and practices that aim 
to create educational contexts that support individuals’ integration into social systems 
of different sorts, whether related to their professional or private lives, and their leisure 
time.
We are aware, however, of the fact that in other contexts the task of the social 
educator is often conceived more broadly, and includes any other task that favors 
social goals. This amounts to what in Germany is labeled “Social pedagogue”, 
which not only includes the tasks performed by social workers, but also by peda-
gogues.
In such contexts, the meaning of the expression “Social Education” tends, 
therefore, to be somewhat ambiguous, and sometimes even to blur the lines. In 
order to counteract this tendency, the International Association of Social Educa-
tors (AIEJI) tries to keep and promote the most precise meaning of the term. We 
adhere to their account of the field.
a Currently teaches Catalan language, culture and literature in the Department of 
Romance Languages and Literatures at the University of Chicago. She also works as 
a consultant for “Applied ethics to social education” at the Open University of Cata-
lunya.
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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine the theoretical founda-
tions of the professional secret and confidentiality in Social Work and 
Social Education in order to propose an alternative approach to the issue 
which does not reduce the professional secret to a utilitarian device de-
signed to increase the success of social services. Our approach rests upon 
the idea that the professional secret not only protects the individual that 
has confided a secret, but also society as a whole, since intimacy and 
privacy are a necessary presupposition of all other human rights. Under-
stood this way, the professional secret should be regarded as a cornerstone 
of democracy. The article therefore concludes by warning policy-makers 
and social workers and educators of the paradox inhabited by the profes-
sional secret: breaching confidentiality may be simultaneously an inevi-
table measure to safeguard society and a way to render society as a whole 
more vulnerable.
Keywords: Giorgio Agamben, Aporia, Confidentiality, Democracy, 
Duties, Professional Secret, Right to Intimacy, Right to Privacy, Social 
Education, Social Work, Vulnerability.
INTRODUCTION
Many professionals often face the dilemma of whether to disclose 
personal information that a client or a user of the service they practice 
has entrusted to them. The laws and the deontological codes that regulate 
professions clearly establish that personal information confided by the 
user –such as religious beliefs, sexual orientation, race, and personal his-
tory and plans– should be kept secret even when the professional relation-
ship has ended: therefore, it is never legitimate to reveal information 
through petty gossiping or with libelous aims. There are, however, certain 
situations of force majeure that require ―often by law― the revelation 
of the secret for the sake of the same individual that has confided it2 or 
on behalf of a third person whose life would otherwise be endangered.3
2 Herein lies the Welfare Principle.
3 Herein lies the Principle of Justice.
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Thus, even those professionals who know the law4 and are rationally 
extremely competent often find themselves trapped within a juridical 
collision or antinomia (the duty to keep the professional secret versus the 
duty to disclose it) and a moral collision (whether his duty is first to the 
user or to society). This antinomia is particularly challenging in the fields 
that we will examine, Social Education and Social Work, since their main 
instrument of change is information (Albers and Morris, 1990, p. 12). 
Moreover, the vulnerability of the users of these services ―often evidenced 
by drug addiction, alcoholism, maltreatment, children abuse, etc.― further 
complicates the dilemma. 
In an attempt to aid professionals in navigating such situations, schol-
ars and institutions are making an effort to delimit the exceptions to the 
imperative of the professional secret. In our opinion, in spite of the rigor 
of the casuistic designed by them, many exceptions have gone too far: 
sometimes, the application of their “casuistry of exceptions” leads to the 
disappearance of the very notion of professional secret. In other words, 
if what the confider wants to be kept secret is to be disclosed each time 
they so indicate, then these secrets must almost always be revealed, and 
thus, the professional secret is deprived of its factual existence.
The aim of this article is to revisit the theoretical foundations of the 
professional secret in order to explore its raison d’être and to call for care 
when tempted to breach it. The article is divided into four sections. In 
the first one we discuss the juridical framework of the professional secret 
in Social Education and Social Work. Special attention is paid to the 
Spanish and Catalan frameworks. In the second one, the exceptions to 
the professional secret envisioned by said regulations and by current 
scholars are discussed and problematized: should there really be so many 
exceptions? Our first thesis is articulated at this point: do not the reasons 
that underpin the exceptions deprive the very notion of professional secret? 
The third and fourth try to answer this question by addressing the central 
issue of this paper: the raison d’être of the professional secret. Section 3 
offers an overview of the most common arguments employed to legitimize 
the professional secret, and Section 4 contains our second thesis, which 
constitutes our original contribution to the issue: an alternative view of 
4 Which unfortunately is not always the case. See Albers & Morrison (1990). They 
examine the case of Canadian social workers in the 1980s who assured they knew the 
importance of confidentiality, but whose practice was totally disconnected from this 
supposed knowledge.
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the raison d’être of the professional secret which recasts some ideas by 
Ian E. Thompson (1979) and some by Giorgio Agamben (1995; 2003), 
and forces us to reexamine the criteria according to which confidentiality 
may be breached. The article concludes with a call to prudence for the 
safeguard of democracy to those considering the possibility of breaching 
the professional secret. 
SECTION I. JURIDICAL FRAMEWORK
When establishing the moral and juridical foundation of the profes-
sional secret, scholars tend to turn to the well-known Hippocratic Oath:5 
And whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession, as well 
as outside my profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what should not 
be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets.
Nevertheless, as Thompson holds, this appeal to the Oath is a serious 
mistake. First, because throughout history the Oath was present only 
intermittently, and second because its origin did not have to do with 
present-day rights and duties, but rather with an esoteric cult that aimed 
to preserve trade secrets and control the initiates to the Hippocratic School 
(Thompson, 1979, p. 57). 
The current shape of the professional secret and its associated duty of 
confidentiality stems from the 12th article of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights ―adopted by the UN General Assembly on the 10th 
of December 1948― namely, the right to intimacy, which reads: “No 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interfer-
ence or attacks.” 
Ethical and deontological codes of several professions had already 
mentioned the need to protect the personal information and the private 
life of their services’ users, as was the case of the Code of Ethics of Social 
Workers in 1922. But ever since the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, several supranational institutions have included the right to inti-
5 A document on the Ethics of Medicine written by Hippocrates of Cos (c. 460 
– c. 370 BC).
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macy among their guiding principles and issued documents accordingly. 
Such is the case of the European Convention for the Protection of the 
Human Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms (1950/2010) and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/2007).
At the national level, the right to intimacy has been included in 
democratic constitutions (the Spanish Constitution of 1978 expresses this 
in Articles 18, 20, 24 and 150, for example) and has consequently given 
rise to the development of certain laws concerning the professional secret. 
That is the case of the Organic Law 5/1992, which regulates the auto-
matic treatment of personal data by establishing that such data can only 
be used with the consent of the person in question. Moreover, the Or-
ganic Law 1/1982 of Protection of Honor, Personal and Familiar Inti-
macy and One’s Own Image explicitly forbids the disclosure of informa-
tion regarding another’s private life obtained through one’s professional 
activity. In the same spirit, Article 199 of the Penal Code addresses the 
professional secret by establishing the sentence for individuals who reveal 
secrets about others gained, either directly or indirectly, through their 
work. 
In the Penal Code, the crime is considered much more severe if a social 
worker or a psychologist, for example, reveals a secret, than if the person 
who cleans the psychologist’s office does so. This difference obviously 
derives from the different ways of acquiring the protected information.
As for minors’ rights to intimacy and privacy, Article 4 of the Or-
ganic Law 1/96 of Juridical Protection of Minors, following the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, claims that although parents hold 
an important role when it comes to their children’s education (Article 
18), “nation states are required to protect the child from interference with 
privacy” (Article 16). 
Although the professional secret must be kept by all professionals, it 
is important to highlight that in each profession, this responsibility func-
tions differently, depending on the services’ users and goals. This is why 
social workers and social educators have issued their own documents on 
this issue. Beyond the Code of Ethics of Social Workers of 1922, The 
International Federation of Social Workers’s ethical principles, laid out 
in 1994 by the United Nations Center for Human Rights, are of par-
ticular relevance, as is the deontological code of the Social Workers ap-
proved in 2002 by ASEDES. The issue of the professional secret is so 
red-hot that hundreds of institutions have devoted relevant efforts to it. 
In Catalonia, such is the case of the Col·legi Oficial de Diplomats en 
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Treball Social i Assistents Socials de Catalunya (The Official College of 
Accredited Social Workers and Social Services Providers of Catalonia), 
that in 2000 issued a document developed by the Committee on Confi-
dentiality and the Professional Secret addressing this very issue.
Surely, establishing both an international and a local juridical frame-
work as thorough as the one we have presented has been of great help 
for the preservation of users’ intimacy. However, this structure does not 
prevent the issue of professional secret from being a problematic one for 
those who must adhere to these codes, mainly for two different reasons. 
On the one hand, as we have already mentioned, because the right to 
intimacy sometimes conflicts with other rights that professionals must 
also protect. On the other hand, because the right to intimacy is not re-
garded as a prima facie right, that is, an end in itself, but as a means to 
protect other rights, and other people’s rights (Ramos & Gabaldón 2012: 
9).
Consequently, the very documents that address the professional secret 
describe it as a user’s right that must be kept as long as possible, thus 
insinuating that there are certain cases in which it can be revealed ―some-
times must be revealed― for reasons of force majeure. Determining in 
which cases and for which reasons such disclosure may be performed is 
hugely complex, if not impossible, undertaking. Hence, not only do laws 
try to shed light on this issue, but philosophers, sociologists and scholars 
belonging to the psycho-educative and bio-healthcare field also endeavor 
to illuminate this complicated terrain.
SECTION II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROFESSIONAL SECRET
A comprehensive examination of the regulations mentioned in the 
previous section, relevant academic texts,6 and interviews that express 
personal opinions of experienced social workers7 enables us to outline the 
6 Albers and Morrison (2004), Carlisle et al. (2006), Gewirth (2001), Guedj et al. 
(2006), Jaruseviciene, Levasseur & Liljestrand, (2006), Mayordomo (2002), Ramos 
and Gabaldón (2012), Stone and Isaacs (2003), Thompson (1979), Torrance (2003), 
and Viola (2010).
7 See for example Guedji et al. (2006). After interviewing several French and Brit-
ish professionals, they conclude: “In the US and the UK, it is legitimate to breach 
confidentiality in some cases to protect other people at risk [...] In France, in contrast, 
the emphasis is more on preserving the confidentiality of the patient” (2006, p. 414).
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parameters that could/should induce a professional to reveal a profes-
sional secret are the following:8
a) The involvement of a third person: if a third person (potentially 
the professional himself) is at risk, and such danger could be 
avoided by revealing the information. Herein prevails the Principle 
of Justice. A common case is that of a man who explains he 
abuses his wife but says he is trying to stop. The social worker has 
the duty to report this behavior, as established in Article 11 of the 
Catalan Law 5/2008 on Women’s Right to Eradicate Violence 
Against Women. According to most scholars, the case is different 
if the woman herself confides such information to the social work-
ers and wishes for it to remain secret.
b) The risk of harm to the person who has confided the secret, as in 
the case just mentioned. Herein clearly lies the Welfare Principle. 
c) A user’s lack of autonomy. In this case, regulations and scholars 
tend to assume that the social worker is responsible for the protec-
tion of the subject himself ―i.e, if he expresses a desire to commit 
suicide― and of others. Minors are often included in this category, 
although most scholars specify that they do not become autono-
mous when they turn a certain age, but by showing a certain degree 
of maturity (Stone and Isaacs, 2003).
d) The severity of the harm that would be inflicted were the secret 
not revealed. Consequently, were a social worker or social educa-
tor to learn that a sixteen-years-old child smokes, he should not 
consider revealing this information as much as if he expressed his 
intent to harm another person.
e) The degree of imminence or remoteness of the harm. If the harm 
is about to be inflicted, the social worker might feel obliged to 
report the information. However, if it was inflicted a long time 
ago and there is no evidence that it will happen again, the social 
worker or educator ought to bear in mind that his task is not to 
seek punishment for those who have committed crimes, but 
8 This article addresses the parameters that induce professionals to reveal not only 
a secret, but also the identity of the individual who confided it. The cases in which 
only data are revealed ―namely the cases in which some information is revealed in 
order to be included in statistics and/or to be used for research― are of a completely 
different sort. See Viola (2010, p. 7). 
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rather to provide responsible services to users. Therefore, he should 
seriously consider not reporting this information. 
f ) The consent from the confider to reveal the secret (that should 
always be sought expressly if the secret is, in fact, to be revealed).
g) Under the auspices of the existence of a legal mandate, although 
some deontological codes and theorists do not consider this suffi-
cient cause (i.e., Canimas, 2011, p. 7).
h) Child abuse.
It is important to note that the parameters we have pointed to so far 
cannot be applied blindly, as each incidence’s belonging to any category 
is always a subjective matter of degree and there exists no scale to measure 
them objectively. On the other hand, one must also bear in mind that 
the presumption of innocence should have an impact on the way social 
workers reveal the information they know.9
Lastly, it must also be mentioned that other sort of exceptions have 
been proposed, but in our opinion are thoroughly illegitimate. This is 
the case, among others, of some Lithuanian social workers and physicians 
who, for the supposed sake of family cohesion, have been encouraged to 
tell parents their daughters were pregnant and sought abortion (Jaruse-
viciene, Levasseur and Liljestrand, 2006). In our view, such measures of 
social control pervert the task of social workers.10
Going back to the listed factors: in summary, a professional secret can 
be disclosed11 only if the effects of revealing it are worse than those of 
preserving it.12
This apparently reasonable idea seems in fact highly problematic to 
us. In the first place, because due to the multiple variables involved in 
each situation, it is generally impossible to accurately predict the conse-
 9 Unless a sentence is pronounced, one cannot talk of the crime as if it was un-
questionable.
10 It must be said, though, that these practices are also common in countries with 
long democratic traditions. Think, for instance, of the New Jersey’s ban (August 2013) 
on gay-to-straight conversion therapy. For a description of the controversy this issue 
raised, see Livio (2013).
11 Except by lawyers and priests.
12 This is explicitly stated in Article 20.5 of the Spanish Penal Code. However, it 
is common among social workers ―and deontological codes often suggest it as well― 
to try to solve the problem by other means, that is, by carrying out socio-educational 
work.
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quences of the disclosure of a secret. A classic conundrum: a woman tells 
a social worker that she has been abused by her husband, but swears that 
it was only once and will never happen again, what is the social worker 
to do? The immediate thought is usually to report it. However, he might 
think that the consequences of reporting it would be worse than those of 
keeping the secret (upon learning that his wife has reported the abuse, 
the husband could harm her again before the legal system –sometimes 
too slow– could prevent this and other future repeat offenses). On the 
other hand, if the social worker does not report it, and instead continues 
with a socio-educational line of treatment with the family in question 
―which sometimes proves to be more successful than reporting the of-
fense to the authorities― he can never be certain that the abuse will not 
be repeated (although perhaps it will not) and, if it were to happen to be 
repeated, he could be punished by law for not having reported it. Hence 
the tendency to report every single bit of information that the confider 
asks to be kept secret.
In the second place, the idea that a professional secret can/must be 
disclosed if the effects of revealing it are worse than those of preserving 
it seems to us problematic for a second, and more important reason: it 
deprives the professional secret of its raison d’être.
When an individual asks the social worker or social educator not to 
reveal certain information, it is precisely because one or some of the 
listed parameters are at play. In other words, an individual only wants 
some information to be kept secret if a third person is involved (Param-
eter a), and/or if his own life is in risk (Parameter b), and/or if he knows 
that he is not mentally autonomous and consequently someone else might 
legitimately decide for him (c), and/or if the harm at risk is severe (d and 
e), and/or if there is a legal mandate (g), and/or if it is a case of child 
abuse (h). The individual will want the information to remain secret 
precisely because one was of the aforementioned parameters at work. If 
none of these parameters were at work, the user would lack any motiva-
tion for wanting some information to remain hidden. To put it simply, 
what usually prompts a social worker to reveal a secret is exactly what 
made the confider ask for this information to remain secret. This is the 
first thesis we put forth in this paper.
This leads us to think that the professional secret is losing its raison 
d’être. Haven’t we perhaps gone too far? This is what Canimas (2011, 
pp. 25-26) seems to suggest when stating that sometimes the best choice 
is not to report, and what Ramos and Gabaldón mean when writing that 
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obeying the law is not always ethical when a professional secret is in 
question (2012, p. 13).
SECTION III. WHY SHOULD SOME PERSONAL INFORMATION 
REMAIN SECRET?
Why should some information remain secret? Why need is there for 
the professional secret? Why should a professional consider remaining 
silent when he knows somebody has stolen goods? The reasons vary 
across professions;13 we will focus on Social work and Social Education. 
Needless to say, if Social Work and Social Education were to be con-
ceived ―or were still conceived― on the basis of a paternalistic model 
there would be no need for confidentiality: the social worker, in order 
to rescue the user from his vulnerability and marginality, would be al-
lowed to access and circulate any information from or about the user. 
However, since Social Work and Social Education have evolved around 
a model based on the autonomy of the user (Ramos and Gabaldón, 2012), 
confidentiality has become necessary. 
The wide range of arguments usually advanced to sustain the profes-
sional secret varies across place and author, but the most usual ones can 
be synthesized into the following four trends. In the first place, the most 
commonly used argument goes, only if confidentiality is guaranteed will 
the user speak openly, and since information is the main instrument of 
change available to social workers (Albers & Morris 1990), only under 
terms of confidentiality will the service be successful. Confidentiality 
improves communication and this, in turn, is essential for the social 
worker to carry out his task which, by its turn, benefits the user. Taken 
to its ultimate consequences, this implies that there is an inherent danger 
in the excess of communication, and thus communication must have 
limits (Canimas, 2011, p. 4).Therefore, the professional secret can be 
regarded as one of the conditions of possibility of communication.
Herein lies a classic utilitarian argument. Utilitarian and consequen-
tialistic arguments also inhabit the heart of several other arguments that 
legitimize the professional secret. A second and complementary argument 
holds that the professional secret is designed not only to protect the user, 
13 Two well-known fields which stand out because of their particularities concern-
ing confidentiality are that of lawyers and priests.
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but also the professional, since it allows the professional to carry out his 
job (Canimas, 2011, p. 2). Canimas, by reminding us of the etymology 
of the term “confidential” ―‘with’ plus ‘faith, protection, shelter, credit, 
honesty, loyalty’― concludes that confidentiality offers a reciprocal pro-
tection to those who practice it. 
In the third place, some theorists also utilitarianly claim that since the 
goal of social work and education is to better integrate individuals who 
inhabit the margins of society into the social fabric, thus reducing their 
vulnerability, breaching confidentiality would be thoroughly counter-
productive, since exposing one’s privacy or circulating such privacy 
renders one more vulnerable. The more vulnerable a subject is, they claim, 
the more he needs confidentiality (Ramos and Gabaldón, 2012, p. 8).
The fourth reason is being used more and more to argue for preserv-
ing confidentiality when the service user is a minor, a particularly delicate 
case. While the main tendency was formerly to breach confidentiality 
more often when dealing with minors than with adults, maintaining that 
parents have the right to know about delicate issues affecting their 
children,14 Carlisle et al. (2006) argue precisely the opposite and call for 
a reversal of this tendency. Their argument holds that in order to de-
velop autonomy, minors (and particularly teenagers) need to build a 
private space to which parents should not always have access. Systemati-
cally breaking confidentiality to report each of their child’s steps to parents 
would therefore prevent said child from appropriately developing his 
individual autonomy.
Once again, this argument pertains to the realm of utilitarianism. In 
our opinion, while the four aforementioned arguments are legitimate, 
there is another argument ―often overridden― which is not only heftier, 
but which moreover does not reduce the professional secret to a means 
designed to make social services more efficient. Instead, it has to do with 
considering intimacy and privacy as ends in and of themselves. If inti-
macy and privacy are means to a higher end, they can ultimately be reduced 
to nothing. If, by contrast, they are considered values prima facie, their 
raison d’être will be protected from the severity of certain situations.
14 See Stone and Isaacs (2001), who explore how certain counselors react if they 
learn that the minors they assist smoke cigarrettes, sneak out to meet a boy/girlfriend, 
have sexual intercourse, smoke marihuana, use crack cocaine, seek abortion the next 
day, or express that life is too tough for living.
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SECTION IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH  
TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Priests, after hearing confession, and to some extent, lawyers, by 
representing their clients, serve and are principally responsible to the 
individual sharing personal information, and therefore should not breach 
confidentiality in any way. However, caseworkers serve and are princi-
pally responsible to both the individual and to society: in fact, their duty 
is to help the individual to function within society. This, then, justifies 
that  confidentiality ―and with  it,  individuals’  rights  to  intimacy  and 
privacy― sometimes be suspended. This justification underpins all the 
utilitarian arguments examined above.
On the one hand, it has been objected that when the interests of soci-
ety cannot be reconciled with the individual’s interests, social workers 
and specialized educators’ first duty is to the most vulnerable part; their 
primary pursuit was never to punish those who have committed crimes 
(Canimas, 2011, p. 26). Thus, social work theory turns so often to the 
so-called “ethics of hospitality”. Martin Buber (1923, p. 11) claims that 
when relating to another, the Other fills the whole arc of sky (1923, 
p. 11); Emmanuel Lévinas (1961) calls for an unconditional welcome of 
the other, regardless of his origin and beliefs, without reserves and with-
out calculation. 
Yet in our opinion, beyond this objection, there lies another reason 
why a social workers’ equal duty to society as well as to the individual 
does not legitimize exposing users’ secrets so often. 
At first glance, the theoretical framework of democracy is incompat-
ible with maintaining the professional secret ―why should information 
that threatens the community be hidden? Within democracy, the argu-
ment goes, there must be no dark corner that resists the transparency that 
safeguards peaceful coexistence. Apparently, then, within the confines of 
democracy, one is rendered incapable of arguing successfully to legitimate 
the professional secret.
We want to suggest precisely the opposite: in a democracy, secrets are 
an immeasurably powerful instrument to protect the collective. Conse-
quently, it could be argued that the professional secret does not threaten 
democracy, but is actually inscribed within its theoretical frame and must 
be preserved in order for other generalized tenets of democracy to be 
functional. What is more: the professional secret can be regarded as 
one of the cornerstones of democracy.
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Let us explain this proposal by developing an idea that Thompson 
mentions only in passing in 1979, but which unfortunately does not ap-
pear again in more recent bibliography. Thompson writes:
That the individual should be spiritually inviolate, in the sense of being 
protected from the invasion, violation and abuse of his privacy would seem to 
be the necessary presupposition of his possession of any of the other individu-
al human rights claimed for him [...]. We must, I think, grant the existence of 
a right to privacy on formal grounds once we concede the existence of per-
sonal rights in any form (Thompson, 1979, p. 59).
In other words, the right to intimacy and the right to privacy are not 
mere rights among others equal in scope ―“for without it [privacy] there 
would be no private individuals to have or exercise those rights” (Thomp-
son 1979 59)― but truly the condition of possibility of all other rights. 
And, in the same fashion, in our opinion, the professional secret is as 
well. For without the professional secret, society as a collective would be 
more vulnerable, given that the theoretical foundation for human rights 
would be vanquished. Thus, the raison d’être of the professional secret is 
discovered in all its fortitude, and therefore, a gross violation of the foun-
dations of democracy is committed each time a professional secret is re-
vealed.
And yet, the issue is not that simple. 
Foucault distinguishes between zoe ―natural life, the simple fact of 
living common to all living beings― and bios ―the form of life typical 
of social beings, that is, political existence. He argues that for centuries, 
Man’s life was zoe, but then changed in the 18th century, when zoe became 
an element of bios. Since then, zoe could no longer be conceived outside 
the polis legality. Political power came to meddle in the subject’s life, 
subjects being therefore configured by a power external to them. The 
outside of law ceased to exist. According to Foucault, this was the decisive 
event that opened up modernity. Giorgio Agamben (1995) holds that 
this phenomenon ―a threshold of indistinction between the outside and 
the inside of the law― constitutes the core of Western politics. He claims 
that there is no natural life, and that there has never been any life alien 
to the law –and that this omnipresence of law makes individuals terribly 
vulnerable. He points out that this omnipresence underpins totalitarian 
states: these regimes possess the right to know every single aspect of pri-
vate life ―and ultimately, there is no private life: in the Big Brother style, 
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everything is exposed. The right to intimacy, as any other individual right, 
might be suspended for the sake of society. But, according to the Italian 
thinker, the same phenomenon is at work in democracy. Pointing out 
that Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp does not differ in essence from 
Auschwitz Concentration Camp, he goes so far as to say that in democ-
racy individuals live in a permanent state of exception15 in which, as 
Walter Benjamin put it in his eighth thesis on the philosophy of history, 
the suspension of the norm has become the rule.
Agamben is thus bringing to light the aporetic core of democracy, 
which he describes as a double-bind: democracy tries to protect the subjects 
it needs to render vulnerable in order to guarantee their protection. In 
other words, the unconditional exposure of everybody’s life, the pur-
ported goal of which is to protect individuals, also renders individuals 
more vulnerable. Democracy aims to protect citizens, and hence the 
existence of human rights, but can suspend said rights in order to protect 
them. Democracy threatens us precisely because it protects us or, put 
another way, precisely by protecting us.
In our opinion, the dilemma of revealing/keeping the professional 
secret is but a side effect of this aporia. The rights to intimacy and to 
privacy can be suspended for the sake of society, yet this transgression of 
rights exposes society to a terrible force that renders it more vulnerable.
CONCLUSIONS
In Section II we exposed our first thesis: that the reasons why a 
user would request certain information to be kept secret are the same 
reasons a social worker or educator would use to justify revealing this 
very secret. 
In Section IV we have put forward an alternative foundation for the 
professional secret. With this reasoning we mean to have dismantled the 
dichotomy that holds that revealing a professional secret when “needed” 
is to stand on the side of society and democracy, while keeping said secret 
is to stand on the side of the individual ―and thus the dark, the irra-
tional, the unjustifiable. By showing that the aforementioned dichotomy 
is only apparent, that is, by deconstructing it, we have attempted to 
demonstrate that keeping a secret might, in many cases, be taking a stand 
15 See as well Agamben (2003).
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for society/democracy, since the protection of individual intimacy is a 
cornerstone of democracy.
We therefore conclude that:
a) A social worker or social educator should bear in mind, when 
considering breaching the professional secret imperative, that by 
doing so he is exposing the fragile ground upon which democracy 
rests.
In Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and 
Taboo (1966), Mary Douglas examined the arbitrary arguments and facts 
upon which social order rest. According to her, the system is always 
founded upon something external to it and cannot be understood by the 
logic of this system.16 At the beginning there is always a force, a violence, 
a sacrifice. It could be argued that the same applies to democracy: as 
Agamben reveals, democracy rests upon an aporetic logic: it needs to 
include what it tries to exclude ―namely, the suspension of rights. 
Douglas further analyzes how the arbitrary forces that open up certain 
social orders must become taboo in order to protect said order. If such 
foundations are exposed, sooner or later the order will be overturned. 
Again, the same applies to democracy. At the root of democracy there is 
a contradiction which cannot be legitimated by the logic of democracy, 
but which is self-justifying. In Derridean terms, democracy is self-im-
mune.17 If this contradiction is too evident, unsatisfied citizens will try to 
knock down the system.
While we do not mean to hide the problematic foundations of democ-
racy, it is undeniable that exposing such fragility too often renders the 
democratic system more vulnerable, and hence all of society more vulner-
able as well. From our perspective, revealing a professional secret is just 
such a way of doing so. Had we an alternative sociopolitical and eco-
nomic system, it would be necessary to exert pressure on these fissures 
of democracy in order to dismantle it. However, so long as we lack a 
better alternative system, exposing such fragility can prove extremely 
dangerous since it can lead to the replacement of democracy by other 
16 See Derrida (1986) and Ieven (2006) for a thorough examination of the same 
phenomenon.
17 See Derrida (2003), where he holds that there is a point in which democracy 
requires a non-democratical decision. Hence the aporia it rests upon.
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systems which have proved worse in many aspects –especially regarding 
the protection of vulnerable individuals. And we must bear in mind that 
the double-bind of democracy ―protecting and at the same time depriv-
ing individuals’ rights― revealed by Giorgio Agamben no longer allows 
us to state that there some citizens are vulnerable; all individual members 
of society are. Thus, the professional secret protects everyone ―at least 
to some extent.
b) In no way do we mean that we are opposed to taking the listed 
parameters into account in order to set out some exceptions to the 
imperative of confidentiality. We do believe that said parameters 
are reasonable and legitimate; yet, in our opinion, the tendency 
should be to try as much as possible to avoid making such excep-
tions. Unfortunately, there are no means by which to establish a 
clear-cut threshold, but we encourage policy-makers, social work-
ers and educators to incorporate our reflection.
Furthermore, we believe that what should induce social workers and 
educators to make an exception to confidentiality in the first place, ought 
to be the fact that confidentiality is not only a negative right –a trust based 
upon not saying anything– but also a positive right, that is, it entails 
positive duties regarding that trust. Gewirth (2001) lucidly –and briefly– 
exposes this idea: 
Viewed directly, confidentiality is a negative right, insofar as the obligation 
or duty it entails is the negative one of refraining from divulging information 
about the client or other subjects. [...] But the right to confidentiality is also a 
positive right in that it entails the positive duty to help the client to maintain 
her autonomy and trust (2001, p. 485).
The users’ duty, in turn, is to take advantage of the social worker’s 
guidance. That is, it is not only the caseworker who has duties, but also 
the client or user. Among others duties, the user has the duty “to try to 
benefit from the caseworker’s guidance. [...] with the caseworker’s help, 
[he has] to try to move in that more beneficial direction” (2001, p. 486).
Given the fact that confidentiality is also a positive right, and that the 
client has a duty to benefit from the guidance offered by the professional, 
he will have to accept that sometimes the need for confidentiality must 
be overcome: that sometimes the best option is to reveal the information 
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he initially wished to remain a secret. In this case, the social worker will 
likely have to guide the user to reach this conclusion.
Foremost in the consideration of revealing a secret should be, then, 
the positive character of the duty of confidentiality. Consequently, in our 
opinion, the aforementioned parameters (a to h) should be taken into 
consideration later, as a subsequent complement, only in a secondary 
scope of consideration. They come as a secondary consideration in the 
rationale process because so they are indeed secondary, conceptually.
c) As long as the idea of “revealing” a secret presupposes a certain 
notion of “revealing the truth”, the notion of “telling the truth” 
should be re-examined. The text by Bonhoeffer (1937) “What is 
meant by telling the truth?” could be a suggestive point of departure, 
as Torrance (2003) already pointed out. Bonhoeffer considers that 
“‘telling the truth’ means something different according to the 
particular situation in which one stands” (1937, p. 363). Accord-
ingly, reporting facts is not always a way of speaking the truth. In 
his own words: 
I speak flatteringly or presumptuously or hypocritically without uttering 
a material untruth; yet my words are nevertheless untrue, because I am disrupt-
ing and destroying the reality of the relationship between man and wife, supe-
rior and subordinate, etc. [...] The truthful word is not in itself constant; it is 
as much alive as life itself. [...] [I]f ‘the truth is told’ without taking into account 
to whom it is addressed, then this truth has only the appearance of truth, but 
it lacks its essential character (1937, p. 360).
In short: the social worker has to stand on the side of truth, and this 
does not always imply revealing information in minute detail.
When asking ourselves what should be understood by “telling the 
truth”, one should ask about the most appropriate ways to reveal such 
truth18 ―as there are different levels of confidentiality19 ― and who should 
18 At this point, the issue of to what extent communication can ever be successful 
deserves special attention. See for example Derrida (1972, p. 367).
19 See Stone & Isaacs (2001). They distinguish four degrees of confidentiality: 
total confidentiality, “limited confidentiality for which minors waive the right to know 
what may be disclosed in advance”, “informed forced consent when a child is pro-
vided advance notice that information will be revealed”, and no guarantees about 
confidentiality (2001, p. 344). See also Canimas (2011, pp. 21-23). 
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know this truth.20 The same care ought to be taken when filing this 
“truth”.21
d ) It is particularly relevant to explore what sort of information might 
be treated as a secret. Firstly, without doubt, whatever the con-
fider asks to be preserved. Yet, is there something beyond that 
which the confider asks explicitly to be kept secret that should 
likewise not be revealed? Yes, there is.
In our view, any information learned by the social worker ―heard, 
seen or inferred― that he has reason enough to believe that the user would 
prefer to remain secret should be treated just as any information explic-
itly labeled a secret ―meaning, with the same discretion― and be governed 
by the same regime of exceptionality. This is the case of a user with a 
black eye who spends the day with the social worker or other educator 
and does not explain to him what has happened (Gewirth, 2001, p. 480). 
The worker may draw the conclusion that her husband hit her, but since 
she did not mention it, he should deduce that she would prefer him not 
to have noticed it. 
This broader way of conceiving the professional secret is to some 
extent problematic: which of the data the social worker learns can be 
revealed? Taken to an extreme, this definition would prevent the social 
worker from speaking about the user ever. As Georg Simmel puts it in 
“The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies”, “[a]ll relationships of 
people to each other rest, as a matter of course, upon the precondition 
that they know something about each other. The merchant knows that 
his correspondent wants to buy at the lowest price and to sell at the high-
est price. The teacher knows that he may credit to the pupil a certain 
quantity and quality of information” (Simmel, 1906, p. 441).
20 If a social worker is aware of the fact a father abuses his child, the professional 
might consider the possibility of reporting it to the school the child attends. Yet should 
all the teachers who teach the child be informed? Or rather, should the complete in-
formation be reserved for the director and the child’s classroom teacher, while the rest 
of his teachers should only be told that the child is undergoing “severe familiar difficul-
ties?” 
21 And the ARCO rights should always be respected, that is, the users should be 
allowed to access, modify, cancel, and oppose the information archived (Spanish Or-
ganic Law 15/1999 on the Protection of Personal Information).
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Consequently, knowing the other is not a result of dealing for with 
him for some minimum amount of time, rather a precondition of such 
relationship. We know a great deal about the other even before he says 
anything. Are social workers entitled to talk about this sort of informa-
tion with somebody else? In our opinion, any information they have 
before exchanging a first word with the user should be treated with the 
same care as the explicitly revealed information.
Of course, the conclusions our article leads to do not simplify the 
substantially complex issue of discerning when to reveal and when to keep 
a professional secret, on the contrary: but nevertheless, we believe these 
new considerations should also be taken into account. Again, drawing 
the line between what can be said and what should not be is of extraor-
dinary complexity. But we encourage policy-makers, social workers and 
educators to deal with this issue with the delicacy it deserves. And we 
hope to have shown the foundations for this delicacy. Only by treating 
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